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I. Introduction
by Robin Potter
Overtime Wages and the Suffer or Permit to Work Standard under the Fair Labor
Standards Act1
In the late 1800s and early 1900s,
sweatshop conditions, long hours,
low wages, and dirty unsafe
facilities characterized the land-
scape of the American workplace
and factory.2   Men, women and
children labored eighty hour work
weeks, and carpenters worked
fourteen to sixteen hours a day for
a mere fifty cents.3   By the turn of
the twentieth century, hundreds
of men, women, and children
worked seventy to eighty hours a
week, seven days a week, under
substandard conditions and wages
in hundreds of New York City
garment shops.4   If the workers
did no work on Sunday, they
suffered from the industrial
capital punishment of discharge,
and no job to return to on Monday
morning.5
By the time of the 1884
convention of the Federation of
Organized Trades and Labor
Unions, workers threatened that
if the eight hour day was not won
by May 1, 1886, they would
strike.6   Ignored by their employ-
ers, on May 1, 1886, over 300,000
workers participated in the first
general strike in the history of the
international labor movement.7   In
1886 alone, over 600,000 workers
fought for an eight-hour work day by
participating in over 1,500 strikes and
lockouts nationwide.8   They called for
“eight hours for work, eight hours for
rest, eight hours for what we will.”
Legislation to control hours of
work was often met with correspond-
ing reductions in pay leading to
further workplace strife.  Such was
the case in the Lawrence textile strike
of 1912:
The State Legislature had
just passed a law reducing the
hours of labour from 56 to 54 per
week, and there was rumour that
our pay would be reduced
accordingly.  Our next pay day was
Friday, January 12 . . .
There was a sharp whistle.
It was the call that said  . . . “Come
and get your pay!”  Just like any
other Friday, the paymaster, with
the usual armed guard, wheeled a
truck containing hundreds of pay
envelopes to the head of a long line
of anxiously waiting people . . .
When the great moment came, the
first ones nervously opened their
envelopes and found that the
company had deducted two hours’
pay.  They looked silly, embar-
rassed and uncertain what to do.
Milling around, they waited for
someone to start something. They
didn’t have long to wait, for one
lively young Italian had his mind
thoroughly made up and swung
into action without looking into his
pay envelope. “Strike! Strike!” He
yelled. To lend strength to his
words as he ran, passed our line,
then down the room between
spinning frames. The shop was
alive with cries of “Strike!” after
the paymaster left  . . .  A tall
Syrian worker pulled a switch and
the powerful speed belts that gave
life to the bobbins slackened to a
stop. There were crises: “All Out!”
And then hell broke loose in the
spinning room.9
On May 24, 1937, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt introduced
the bill that later became the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  Senator
Hugo Black of Alabama (who later
served as an associate justice of the
Supreme Court) and Representative
William Connery of Massachusetts
sponsored the bill in their respective
houses of Congress.  Roosevelt told
Congress that there was no justifica-
tion for “chiseling workers’ wages or
stretching workers’ hours.”10   A year
later, the FLSA became law.11   The
purpose behind the FLSA was to
protect employees from “substandard
wages and excessive hours, which
endangered the national health and
well-being  .  .  . ”12   In the words of FDR,
“Our nation so richly endowed . . .
should be able to devise ways and
means of insuring to all able-bodied
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working men and women a fair day’s
pay for a  fair day’s work.”13  The FLSA
combated the evils of overwork and
underpay by establishing substantive
rights to a minimum hourly wage and
to overtime pay at a rate of time and a
half for work over forty hours in a
work week for the working class.14
The minimum wage was initially set
at $.25 per hour and the maximum
workweek was initially set at forty-
four hours.15
This article explores a major area
of litigation and compliance deficien-
cies under the FLSA.  It focuses on the
requirement that employers pay the
overtime premium whenever they
“suffer or permit” employees to work
more than forty hours in a week.
II. An Overview of the FLSA
The FLSA requires that employ-
ers pay employees at least $5.15 per
hour,16  although Illinois statute sets a
higher minimum. The act also
prohibits the employment of “oppres-
sive child labor,”17  which the statute
defines as employment of a child under
sixteen or a child between sixteen and
eighteen years old in violation of
regulations issued by the Secretary of
Labor.18   The FLSA requires that
employees be paid one and one-half
times their regular rate of pay for
hours worked in excess of forty in a
workweek.19
However the workweek is defined,
it does not have to coincide with the
calendar week, but once established
must be fixed and regularly recur-
ring.20   Regular rate of pay is defined to
include “all remuneration for employ-
ment paid to, or on behalf of, the
employee” with certain enumerated
statutory exceptions.21   Regular rate
includes wages, salaries, commis-
sions, production bonuses, piece rates,
and night shift differentials, as well as
other forms of compensation discussed
in the Department of Labor (DOL)
regulations.22
Public and private sector employ-
ers must compensate employees for all
hours worked under the FLSA.  In the
public sector, assuming the employer
meets the requirement of the Act to
have an agreement or understanding
prior to the performance of the work,
the employee may be paid compensa-
tory time off in lieu of overtime pay.
Public sector employees are generally
limited to accrual of up to 240 or 480
hours of compensatory time, the latter
for public safety employees.23
The FLSA created within DOL the
Wage and Hour Division (WHD).24
FLSA cases represent approximately
83 percent of all of the cases handled by
the WHD every year.25   In 2003, as a
result of WHD investigations, 314,660
employees collected $182 million in
back wages for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which was a
27.4% increase over the $143 million
collected for 241, 568 employees  in
2002.26  In addition, WHD fined
employers $9,993,041.44 in FLSA civil
money penalties.27
It is black letter FLSA law, that to
protect workers from substandard
wages and oppressive working hours,
there are only two ways an employee
may waive a claim for back overtime.28
First, a claim may be settled if an
employee accepts the back overtime
payment authorized and supervised by
the Secretary of Labor (assuming the
employer paid all wages due or agreed
to by the DOL); second, a claim may be
waived by entry of court judgment.29
In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc.,30  the Supreme
Court held that employees who
pursued their wage claims through
the grievance and arbitration proce-
dure of their collective bargaining
agreement and lost were not barred
from bringing suit under the FLSA by
the adverse arbitration decision.  In
holding that the FLSA claim was
independent of the outcome of the
grievance under the collective bar-
gaining agreement, the Court placed
the issue in the context of a long line of
precedent concerning waivers of FLSA
rights:
This Courts’ decisions interpret-
ing the FLSA have frequently
emphasized the nonwaivable na-
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ture of an individual employee’s
right to a minimum wage and to
overtime pay under the Act.  Thus
we have held that FLSA rights
cannot be abridged by contract or
otherwise waived because this
would “nullify the purposes” of the
statute and thwart the legislative
policies it was designed to
effectuate.  Moreover, we have held
that congressionally granted FLSA
rights take precedence over con-
flicting provisions in a collective
bargained compensation arrange-
ment.31
Barrentine remains the seminal
authority holding that unsupervised
waivers of FLSA rights are void. Thus,
forcing employees to agree to work off
the clock without overtime pay,
violates Barrentine.  For example, in
Belbis v. County of Cook,32  nurses
employed at Cook County hospital
sued, claiming they were not paid pre-
and post-shift, for job training and
that the hospital failed to keep
required records of hours worked.
Cook County claimed that the
employees waived their overtime
claims by not filing a grievance under
their collective bargaining agree-
ment.33  Judge Darrah followed
Barrentine and held that FLSA rights
are independent of a collective
bargaining agreement and are not
waivable.34  This ruling directly
affirms the “suffer or permit doctrine”
and strikes down employers’ attempts
to whittle away at its continued
potency, under the guise of “preemp-
tion,” “estoppel” or other litigation
ruses.
“[T]he duty to pay overtime in
conformity with the FLSA is a
reflection of Congressional policy by
which employees are protected in spite
of agreements and/or other actions
that would normally be a defense to
such payment.”35   In Hardrick v.
Airway Freight Systems, Inc., the
company did not “require,” but allowed
overtime if the employees agreed to
accept straight time pay.36   Following
Barrentine and its progeny, the court
held that the unsupervised waiver was
invalid.37   Simply put, the FLSA does
not distinguish between whether the
employee was required or requested to
work — if the employees work more
than forty hours a week, they must be
paid time and a half.
III. Notable Overtime
The American workforce is not
exploited by the same horrendous
working conditions and wage exploita-
tion found at the turn of the twentieth
century. Yet wage and hour exploita-
tion continues in other forms,
including failure to pay workers for all
hours worked or at overtime rates.
Such employer violations have led to
numerous class and collective action
lawsuits with large verdicts or
settlements.
In Mynaf v. Taco Bell Corpora-
tion, 3,000 current and former man-
agers claimed that they were essen-
tially crew members, but their
employer had misclassified them as
executives to avoid compensating
them for overtime labor. After three
weeks in trial, Taco Bell settled for $9
million plus attorneys’ fees and
litigation expenses.38   In 2001, a
California jury awarded $90 million to
a class of 2,400 insurance claims
adjusters alleging denial of overtime
pay in Bell v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange.  The award was upheld by
the California Court of Appeal.39    In
Martins v. Payless Shoe Source Inc.,
1,500 members of a class of salaried
store managers alleged that the
defendant purposely misclassified
them to save millions of dollars in
payroll and taxes.  The parties settled
in mediation for almost $4 million.40
In Kelley v. Pacific Telesis, Case
No. 97 C 2729 *N.D. Cal.) Pacific Bell
settled misclassification overtime
claims in 2001 for $35 million and
ended a five year class action case that
involved 1,500 members.41   In Belazi
v. Radioshack Corporation, Tandy
Corporation, 1,300 plaintiffs chal-
lenged their misclassification and the
employer’s failure to pay for twelve to
thirteen overtime hours per week they
regularly worked selling to customers.
After three mediation sessions, the
parties settled for $29,900,000.42    Fi-
nally, in Albright v. United States,
161 Ct. Cl 356 (1963)  the U.S. Bureau
of Prisons settled an arbitration case
for pre-shift and post-shift overtime
under the Federal Employee Pay Act
for approximately 1,000 bargaining
unit employees for $14 million plus
attorneys’ fees.43
Other major FLSA overtime litiga-
tion is on-going. For example, in
Finnigan v. American Intercontinen-
tal University Online,44  hundreds of
Illinois telemarketers contend that
their employer suffered or permitted
them to work off the clock to deny them
overtime and meet production guide-
lines. The employees allege that
through “duress, coercion, and the
threat of discipline and/or termina-
tion, defendant maintains a company-
wide policy and practice whereby it
compels its Admissions Advisors to
work numerous hours of unpaid
overtime” and “regularly instructed
admissions advisors to alter, falsify
and destroy their time sheets in order
to under-report the number of
overtime hours they worked.”45   Other
employees complain of retaliatory
discharge for protesting the company’s
FLSA violations.46
IV.The Suffer or Permit to
The Fair Labor Standards Act
requires that an employee be paid
overtime pay if the employer “suffers
or permits” the employee to work
overtime.47   The Act’s regulations are
clear that “[w]ork not requested but
suffered or permitted is work time.”48
The standard applies to all private and
public sector employees with some
Litigation
Work Standard
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exceptions, as noted below.
Both private and public employers
who know or should have known that
an employee is working overtime must
pay the employee for the overtime.49
An employer may not stand by and
allow an employee to perform overtime
work without proper overtime com-
pensation.  “Suffer” and “permit” mean
with the knowledge of the employer,
either actual or constructive.50
It is the employer’s duty to make a
reasonable effort to ensure that work
that management does not want
performed is not done. 51   If employer
merely enacts but does not enforce a
rule against overtime, it is not relieved
of FLSA liability. If the employer
knows, or has reason to believe, the
employee is working overtime, but
fails to send the employee home, those
hours are “counted as hours of
employment for purposes of the act,
even though no permission has been
given or the employer has expressly
instructed the employee not to perform
the work during such periods.”52
Public and private employers alike,
have a duty of “reasonable inquiry,” to
determine if work is being performed
on their behalf, given the work
environment, the conditions in the
business and their actual knowl-
edge.53
In Hallemeier v. Schnuck Mar-
kets, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that
defendant violated the FLSA by failing
to properly pay overtime compensa-
tion.54   Specifically, plaintiffs alleged
that they would clock out at the end of
their shift and continue to work.55   The
employer denied that it had knowledge
of any wages due other than what its
time records showed.56   Because a fact
issue existed as to what the employer
knew or should have known,
defendant’s motion to dismiss was
denied.57  To show that defendant
suffered or permitted plaintiffs to
work, plaintiffs only had to show that
the defendant knew or should have
known that an employee was working
overtime.58  If there is constructive
knowledge, an employer must comply
with FLSA  overtime requirements. 59
Amendments to DOL’s FLSA
regulations, the Fair Pay rules,
became effective on August 23, 2004.60
The new regulations revise salary and
duties tests for overtime exemptions
for executive, professional and admin-
istrative employees, and re-define
these white collar exemptions.  The
revisions contained no substantive
amendments to the “suffer or permit”
requirements of the Act.  Conse-
quently, if an employee is not exempt,
the employee remains entitled to
overtime for all hours that the
employer suffers or permits the
employee to work.
V. The Suffer or Permit
Since the passage of the FLSA, the
public sector has increased its share of
non-farm employment by 3 percentage
points.  Overall one out of every six jobs
in the non-farm economy is in
governmental service; the extent of
public employment peaked in March
2001 and has been in decline since
August 2003.61
Initially, the FLSA did not apply to
government workers.  The FLSA was
amended in 1966 to cover state and
local governmental employees of
hospitals, nursing homes, mental
institutions, schools and mass transit
systems. In 1972, the Education
Amendments applied FLSA protec-
tions to employees of public preschools.
By 1974, the FLSA was amended to
apply to most federal employees, and to
state and local governmental employ-
ees.
The standards applied to overtime
claims of federal employees differ from
the general suffer or permit approach.
Doe v. United States 62 was an intrigu-
ing and seminal overtime class action
case involving federal employees.
Standard in the Public Sec-
tor
Attorneys employed by the Depart-
ment of Justice sued for their unpaid
overtime. They won initially, but on
appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reversed the award of summary
judgment for the class and granted
summary judgment to the United
States.  The court relied on the Federal
Employees Pay Act (“FEPA”),63  which
provides for overtime compensation
only when overtime has been “officially
ordered or approved.”64  The operative
Office of Personnel Management
regulation requires that overtime be
officially “ordered or approved . . . in
writing.” 65   Unlike the broader “suffer
or permit” standard of the FLSA,
under the FEPA, “because the
overtime here was not officially
ordered or approved in writing as
required by the regulation, . . . the
plaintiffs were not entitled to compen-
sation . . .”66
Although the suffer or permit
standard applies to state govern-
ments, some state employees have less
redress than their local government or
private sector counterparts.  In Alden
v. Maine,67  the Supreme Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment bars
FLSA suits by state employees against
their state employers in either federal
or state court. This is true whether or
not their employers “suffered or
permitted” them to work. However,
some state statutes permit suits for
FLSA violations and suits may be
brought by the DOL against state
employers.  The Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity recognized in
Alden does not extend to local
governments or other political subdivi-
sions of the states.
The case law is uniform, except as
noted above for FEPA claims and
where claims are barred by Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. If
the employer knows or has reason to
believe that the employee continues to
work, the additional hours must be
counted.”68    It is a crucial lexicon of the
5Spring 2005IPER REPORT
“suffer or permit” doctrine, and part
of the basic underpinning of both the
statutory promise and language of the
FLSA that management “cannot sit
back and accept the benefits without
compensating for them.”69
In Adam v. Brown County,70  the
employer told the nursing staff that
they were expected to perform certain
tasks for a few minutes during a lunch
break or for a few minutes before or
after their shifts but they would not be
compensated.71   The employees did not
fill out cards required by the employer
to claim overtime, but their time card
punches reflected the additional time
that they worked. The employer
argued that without documents of the
employee’s overtime, it had no notice
or obligation to pay.72  The court
disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs’
supervisors told them to work and not
record their time and thus, the
employer had knowledge.73  Moreover,
the county had access to its time clock
records which it used to dock pay when
an employee clocked in late or clocked
out early, so it could have used the
records for determining overtime
compensation.74
In Abel v. Kansas Department of
Corrections,75  the plaintiffs alleged
that they were not paid for the meals
that they missed due to staff shortages
or emergencies.76  The defendant
moved for summary judgment, argu-
ing that the plaintiffs should be
equitably estopped from recovering
overtime for the missed breaks since
they did not record them on their time
sheets.77  The court denied the
defendant’s motion because there was
evidence to infer the defendant had
knowledge of the overtime work.78
Specifically, the defendant had staff
shortages that required some plain-
tiffs to miss their breaks.79   Addition-
ally, the plaintiffs testified that “some
of the supervisors discouraged them
from reporting uncompensated over-
time, that their claims for missed
break periods were sometimes denied
or ignored, and that their supervi-
sors told them to record every break
period whether or not they took a
break.”80   This testimony of the
employer’s manipulation of the
records, not only contravened the
FLSA’s record-keeping requirements,
but called into question the reliabil-
ity of the defendant’s time records,
and created a jury issue.81   Because
the evidence showed that the
employer had at least constructive
knowledge, this case was not an
example of employees concealing
their overtime and later making a
claim for it.82   Thus, the case could
proceed to trial on whether the
employer “suffered or permitted” the
employees to work.
In Hiner v. Penn-Harris-Madison
School Corp.,83 the Penn-Harris-
Madison school district employed
plaintiffs to operate school buses on a
daily basis during the school year.84
Both the school district and the United
States Department of Transportation
required plaintiffs to conduct several
safety inspections each day in addition
to their driving duties.85   Before their
morning departure, plaintiffs had to
perform detailed pre-trip inspections:
inspect the engine compartment, the
front of the bus, the front and rear
suspensions, wheels, brakes, exhaust
system, lights, seats, and emergency
accommodations on the vehicle.86
After finishing their routes in the
afternoon, plaintiffs had to conduct a
complete walk-through of their buses
to ensure they were empty and that all
the windows were closed.87   Plaintiffs
were not compensated for conducting
these inspections.88   In addition,
plaintiffs were not compensated for all
of their driving time.  Plaintiffs were
paid for the time from their first
morning pick-up until their final
afternoon drop-off; however, they were
not paid for the time it took them to
drive to their first morning pick-up
and from their final afternoon drop-
off.89
The court held that plaintiffs’ pre-
first pickup and post-final drop off
driving time constituted working
time for purposes of overtime
compensation under the FLSA.90   In
addition, the court held that plain-
tiffs’ time spent conducting pre- and
post-route bus inspections also
constituted working time for pur-
poses of overtime compensation
under the FLSA.91
Many suffer or permit to work
issues in the public sector involve
police officers.  Two reoccurring issues
concern pay for roll call and pay for
tasks performed while officially off
duty.
In Barefield v. the Village of
Winnetka,92  police officers and civil-
ians were not paid overtime for roll
call. Their meal time was not
considered part of the work day. The
roll call was a fifteen minute pre-shift
daily event.
Roll call was mandatory. During
roll call uniform and equipment
inspections were conducted and
current orders, memoranda, pertinent
activity on prior watches, and
assignments of vehicles and beats
were reviewed.93   Sometimes, a police
officer would even have to handle a call
on the street during roll call.94
In Barefield, plaintiffs sought
compensation for the unpaid roll calls
for an eleven-year period.95   The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
found that the Winnetka Police
Department did not have to compen-
sate the police officers for the roll call
time. The FLSA allows public
employers to establish a work period of
up to twenty-eight days for employees
who provide police or fire protection
services.  When such a work period is
established, the employer is not
required to pay overtime unless an
employee works more than 171 hours
in a 28-day period.96   Because the
addition of the fifteen minute per day
roll call did not bring the police officers’
total time above 171 hours per work
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period, the police officers were not
entitled to overtime.97  As for the
civilian employees, the court found
that their regular eight-hour work
periods included thirty minutes of
meal time, which was not “work” time
under the FLSA.  Thus, the paid meal
time offset the unpaid roll call time
worked by plaintiffs and no overtime
payment was required.98
In Bartoszewski v. Village of Fox
Lake,99  plaintiffs were police officers
and civilian employees of the Fox Lake
Police Department who attended
uncompensated roll call ten minutes
before beginning their shifts each day.
The Illinois Appellate Court for the
Second District held that the plaintiffs
stated a claim for a willful violation of
the FLSA.100   Although the collective
bargaining agreement covering the
police officers referred to a 28-day work
cycle, there was no discussion in the
court’s opinion of village adoption of a
28-day work cycle or its effect on the
village’s FLSA liability.
In Bartoszewski , the plaintiffs also
claimed that the village had violated a
village ordinance by not paying for roll
call time. The court found that the
Village Code provided for a work week
of forty hours and for compensation of
authorized overtime at the regular pay
rate or by being granted compensatory
time.  The court concluded that the
civilian employees who were not
represented by a union stated a
claim.101   The court held, however,
that the sworn police officers did not
have a claim for violation of village
ordinance because their collective
bargaining agreement superceded the
village ordinance and the officers were
required to pursue their claim through
the contractual grievance proce-
dure.102    In other cases, Illinois courts
have upheld claims brought against
other municipalities for breach of
contract or ordinance provisions.103
Police officers engage in a variety of
activities outside of their regular
shifts.  Many of these activities have
resulted in FLSA litigation.  Much of
the litigation has involved time spent
by K-9 officers caring for their dogs.
Courts have held generally that such
activity is conducted for the benefit
of the employer and is compensable
under the FLSA as long as it is
reasonable.104   Courts have held that
time transporting the dog to and
from work may be compensable
depending on whether the officer is
required to provide care for the dogs
during transportation, is precluded
from making personal stops or
whether the dog is a mere passenger
in the officer’s regular commute.105
In Treece v. City of Little Rock,106  the
court held that K-9 officers were
entitled to overtime compensation
for time spent outside the regular
workday cleaning, fueling and main-
taining their police vehicles. The
court found that the city held officers
responsible for the maintenance of
their assigned vehicles and that
special care was needed to ensure
cleanliness because the plaintiffs
were constantly transporting their
dogs in the vehicles.  The court held
that the activities were undertaken
for the employer’s benefit and that,
to the extent that the time expended
was not de minimis, the officers were
entitled to overtime.107
Courts have also considered claims
by police officers to overtime compen-
sation for their off-duty time spent
washing and maintaining their
uniforms and maintaining their
firearms and other equipment.  Com-
pensability for such time has turned
on whether the officers undertake
such activities for the benefit of the
employer and whether such time is
de minimis.108   In Albanese v. Bergen
County, the court held that a Drug
Abuse Resistance Education (DARE)
officer was entitled to overtime for
time spent off-duty preparing for and
scheduling presentations to schools
and youth groups.109
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V. Conclusion
That the FLSA remains a viable and
often litigated statute reflects that
employers continue to violate the law.
The wise words of FDR ring as true
today as in 1937, that there is no
justification for employers “chiseling
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hours.”  It is the hope of this author,
that this article will assist employers
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Interference with Protected
In North Shore District, No. 112, v.
North Shore Education Association,
IEA-NEA and Nan Stein, No. 2003-
CA-0001-C (IELRB 2005), the IELRB
reiterated that in dual-motive cases,
alleging violations of sections 14(a)(3)
and 14(a)(1) of the IELRA, an employer
may not merely rely on legitimate
grounds to take an adverse employ-
ment action, but  must prove that the
action would have been taken
notwithstanding the employee’s pro-
tected concerted activity.
Nan Stein was a non-tenured art
teacher for the Wayne Thomas School.
Following a conflict regarding re-
quested leave and a few other matters,
her contract was not renewed by the
district.  Stein requested time off, as
explicitly allowed by the collective
bargaining agreement.
Half of her request was denied by
the principal at Wayne Thomas
School.  On one of the days for which
Stein was denied leave she had a
scheduled doctor’s appointment.  She
notified the principal one day in
advance of the appointment.  When
challenged on the propriety of her
actions, Stein furnished a letter from
the doctor’s office substantiating that
she was at the office that day.  A few
days later, when Stein was out on her
Activity
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granted leave and a substitute teacher
was in charge of Stein’s art classes, the
principal stopped by the classroom.
The principal was disappointed to find
that Stein’s lesson plan for the day had
not kept the students busy for the full
class time.  Upon complaint to Stein,
Stein submitted an altered lesson plan
for any further absences. The
principal assured Stein that the lesson
plan was “fine”and Stein received no
further complaints regarding her
lesson plans.  A few months later,
Stein left the school building for a
short time without giving notice to the
principal’s office, as she was required
to do under the collective bargaining
agreement.
A short time later, the principal
completed Stein’s evaluation, al-
though Stein had to wait a month
before seeing the evaluation. The
principal rated Stein as not meeting
the district’s standard and recom-
mended that she not be rehired.   Prior
to receiving her evaluation, Stein
wrote four letters which responded, in
turn, to each of the principal’s
accusations and complaints, though
the principal was dismissive of the
letters.  A month later Stein wrote
another letter to address the actual
evaluation.  Stein pointed out that her
teaching abilities were not criticized in
the evaluation; rather her protected
activity was the subject of complaint.
A short time later, the school board
decided not to rehire Stein for the
following term.
The North Shore Education Asso-
ciation and Stein filed an unfair labor
charge alleging violations of sections
14(a)(3) and 14 (a)(1).  The Administra-
tive Law Judge issued a Recommended
Decision and Order in favor of the
school district.
The IELRB reversed and found
violations of both sections of the
IELRA.  To establish a prima facie
case that an educational district has
violated section 14(a)(3) of the IELRA
where retaliation for protected activity
is alleged, the complainant must show
that: 1) the employee engaged in
protected concerted activity; 2) the
district was aware of that activity; and
3) the district took adverse employ-
ment action against the employee that
was motivated by the employee’s
protected activity.  The IELRB found
that: Stein engaged in protected
activity when she requested and took
leave and wrote letters of complaint,
the district was necessarily aware of
her activity, and the district’s decision
not to renew Stein’s contract was
motivated by her protected activity.
The principal admitted to unlawful
motivation in claiming that she began
to consider recommending that the
district not renew Stein’s contract
based on the amount of leave Stein had
requested.
There was also circumstantial
evidence of the district’s unlawful
motivation.  Unlawful motivation can
be inferred through the following
factors: expressions of hostility toward
unionization with knowledge of the
employee’s union activities, timing,
disparate treatment or targeting of
union supporters, inconsistencies
between the reason offered by the
district for the adverse action and
other actions of the district, and
shifting explanations for the adverse
action. The district expressed hostility
toward Stein’s protected activity as
evidenced by the principal’s testimony
that she told Stein that she was
concerned about  Stein’s request for “a
lot of time off” the previous September.
The district’s hostility toward Stein’s
request itself and toward the amount
requested were indicative of unlawful
motivation in the non-renewal of her
contract.  While the district had the
right to deny Stein’s request, its
hostility toward Stein’s request
demonstrated that its subsequent
decision not to renew Stein was
unlawfully motivated by her protected
activity.
The IELRB found that the district
relied, in part, on Stein’s misuse of
sick leave, her poor substitute lesson
plans and her leaving school property
without informing the office, when it
decided not to renew her contract.
Because this was a dual motive case,
the district had to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that
Stein’s contract would not have been
renewed notwithstanding her pro-
tected concerted activity of requesting
and using leave and writing the letters
to the principal.  Although the district
may have had legitimate grounds to
not renew Stein’s contract, it failed to
prove that Stein’s contract would not
have been renewed notwithstanding
her protected concerted activity.  The
district did not show that the
legitimate grounds for its action were
its determinative motivation.
IPLRA Developments
In State of Illinois, Department of
Central Management Services v.
AFCSME Council 31,  Case No. S-RC-
04-038 (ILRB, State Panel 2005), the
State Panel ruled that the assignment
of an Administrative Law Judge who
had not attended the hearing to rule on
the case did not violate principles of
due process.  The Illinois Department
of Central Management Services
(CMS) contended that the ruling
judge’s assignment to the case after
the hearing had been held and
attended by a different judge violated
the due process owed to it.  The State
Panel ruled that due process was not
denied because the hearing was not
adversarial in nature, and instead was
for fact-finding.  Thus, the substituted
Administrative Law Judge was in no
worse position to rule on the case after
reviewing the evidence than the
original Administrative Law Judge
would have been.
CMS also claimed that the new
judge’s factual findings were “inher-
ently unreliable” and that the
Hearing Procedure
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Administrative Law Judge that had
presided at the hearing was in a better
position to judge the credibility of the
witnesses when coming to a decision.
The ILRB disagreed, pointing out that
CMS had not pointed out any instances
in which credibility determinations
could have or did affect the new judge’s
ruling.  The State Panel explained,
“Just because an Administrative Law
Judge makes findings of fact, which
may tend to mirror one’s party’s
testimony over another, does not mean
that she makes credibility determina-
tions.”
Subjects of Bargaining
In AFSCME Council 31 v. Village of
Orland Park, No S-CA-03-197, (ILRB
State Panel 2005), the State Panel
found that the Village of Orland Park
violated sections 10(a)(4) and (1) of the
IPLRA by refusing to bargain with
AFSCME concerning its decision to
implement a new system of project
evaluations for its public works
employees. The panel found that the
procedural aspects of the project
evaluation system were mandatory
subjects of bargaining, but that the
substantive aspects of the system were
not.
The Village of Orland Park had
administered an annual employee
evaluation plan for the prior nine
years. According to the collective
bargaining agreement, these evalua-
tions served as the basis for employees’
step wage increase.  Prior to January
2003, foremen, a position not included
in the bargaining unit, completed the
annual employee evaluations with
some possible input from crew leaders
throughout the year.  In fall 2002, the
village sought to implement a system
of evaluations on employees’ progress
on individual projects that would then
justify the ratings given on and serve
as the basis for the annual employee
evaluations. Employees would be
evaluated on projects selected by the
foremen at least every two to three
months, ensuring that at least four
project evaluations preceded any
annual evaluation. The village imple-
mented the project evaluations on
April 1, 2003, without first bargaining
with AFSCME.
The Administrative Law Judge
found that the village violated sections
10(a)(4) and (1) of the IPLRA, but did
not make a distinction in his decision
between the procedural and substan-
tive aspects of the evaluation system.
The State Panel agreed with the
overall result  that the village violated
the Act but found there to be
distinctions between the procedural
and substantive aspects of the
evaluation system.
Parties are required to bargain
collectively regarding employees’
wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment; therefore a public em-
ployer violates its obligation to
bargain, and consequently sections
10(a)(4) and (1) of the Act, when it
makes a unilateral change in a
mandatory subject of bargaining
without granting prior notice and an
opportunity to bargain to the exclusive
bargaining representative. The village
did not dispute that it did not bargain
with AFSCME before implementing
the evaluation system; therefore, the
question left to the panel was whether
the project evaluations constituted
mandatory subjects of bargaining.
This was an issue of first impression
for the board.
In making its decision, the panel
looked to the decision in Central City
Education Association, IEA/NEA v.
IELRB, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892
(1992).  In Central City, the court held
that a topic is a mandatory subject of
bargaining if it concerns wages hours
and terms and conditions of employ-
ment and: (1) is either not a matter of
inherent managerial authority; or (2)
is a matter of inherent managerial
authority, but the labor board
determines that the benefits of
bargaining outweigh the burdens
bargaining imposes on the employer’s
authority.
In applying the test, the State Panel
found the difference between the
mechanical, procedural aspects of the
employee’s evaluation and the sub-
stantive factors by which the work
performance was rated to be critical.
Under the first prong of Central City,
the panel found it clear that the project
evaluations affected employee terms
and conditions of employment because
they contained different criteria than
those included on the annual evalua-
tions, were completed by crew leaders
as opposed to foremen, occurred more
frequently throughout the work year,
and served as a basis for the annual
evaluations, which in turn controlled
employee wage increases.  The panel
then turned to the second prong of the
Central City test and found that
nothing about the mechanical aspects
of an employee’s evaluation implicated
any of the managerial concerns set
forth in section 4 of the IPLRA;
therefore the panel found the proce-
dural aspects of the project evalua-
tions to be mandatory subjects of
bargaining.
On the other hand, the panel found
the substantive aspects of the
evaluations to involve matters of
inherent managerial discretion.  The
panel found the purpose of the
evaluations in assessing the quality of
work performance to involve impor-
tant policy determinations and to
involve the overall direction of the
village’s workforce.  In addition, the
panel found the village’s ability to
determine the standard and level of
employee work performance to relate
directly to the standards of service it
provided to the surrounding commu-
nity; therefore, the State Panel found
the village’s decisions about the
substantive portion of the project
evaluation system to impact matters
of inherent managerial authority.  The
panel also concluded that the benefits
of bargaining over the substantive
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aspects of the project evaluations did
not outweigh the burdens of bargain-
ing because the panel found the
substantive criteria of the employee
evaluations to be crucial to the
village’s ability to direct its employees.
Requiring bargaining over those
criteria would severely impede that
ability.
Unit Clarification
In State of Illinois, Department of
Central Management Services and
AFSCME, Council 31 v. David
Suarez, No. S-UC-S-04-038 (ILRB
State Panel 2005), the State Panel
dismissed the employer’s and union’s
petition for unit clarification to
exclude David Suarez, an individual
employed as an Information Systems
Analyst II,  from the bargaining unit.
On October 13, 2004, Acting
Executive Director Fred Wickizer
issued an order of clarification
excluding Suarez from the bargaining
unit.  Suarez filed a timely appeal and
the employer filed a timely response.
After reviewing the record, the State
Panel reversed and dismissed the
petition for unit clarification.
According to the panel, the unit
clarification device is used only to
resolve confusion over the composition
of an existing bargaining unit by
clarifying whether particular posi-
tions or titles are properly within the
scope of the unit. Where employees
have been intentionally and histori-
cally included in or excluded from a
bargaining unit, however, it is
inappropriate to use the clarification
process to disrupt the parties’ existing
arrangement.  For this reason, the
board has recognized four limited
circumstances in which the unit
clarification procedure can be used: (1)
where a new job title is created which
entails job functions substantially
similar to those performed by
bargaining unit employees; (2) where
substantial changes occur in the
duties and responsibilities of an
existing title, raising an issue as to the
title’s unit placement; (3) where a
significant change takes place in
statutory or case law which affects the
bargaining rights of employees; and (4)
where an existing job title which is
logically encompassed within the
existing unit was inadvertently
excluded by the parties at the time the
unit was established.
The panel found that none of the
four circumstances were met in this
case. Suarez’s job was not newly
created; there had been no change in
statutory or case law that raised
questions about his placement in the
bargaining unit, and no one claimed
that the analyst’s job duties had
substantially changed.
The panel then examined the fourth
circumstance and found that a unit
clarification petition is appropriate if
the position to be added to the
bargaining unit existed when the unit
was originally formed, but was
omitted through mere inadvertence.
However, in this case, the parties were
not seeking to include Suarez’s
position, but to exclude his position.
Additionally, the panel found that
Suarez had been included in the unit
for over eight years, holding the
analyst title for the last four, and that
the significant amount of time in this
case was not what the board
contemplated when it created the
“inadvertent omission” doctrine.
The panel pointed to County of
Fulton and Fulton County Circuit
Clerk, 6 PERI ¶ 2024 (ISLRB 1990),
where the State Board held that the
unit clarification process could not be
invoked to exclude employees from an
established bargaining unit on the
basis that they were mistakenly
included in the first place.  The panel
also pointed to City of Chicago, 8 PERI
& 3002 (ILLRB 1991) in which the
Local Board rejected an attempt by an
employer to exclude a title that had
been included in an existing bargain-
ing unit for five years after the unit’s
clarification because the city had not
exercised due diligence when it sought
to remove the title from the existing
bargaining unit five years later.  The
State Panel found these cases
analogous to the instant case and
ordered the unit clarification petition
dismissed.
EEO Developments
In Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct.
1536 (2005), the Supreme Court found
that employers can be held liable for
disparate impact claims arising under
the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA).  Petitioners, a group
of police and public safety officers for
the City of Jackson, Mississippi,
challenged a pay plan which granted
raises to all city employees.  Under the
plan, employees with less than five
years tenure received proportionately
greater raises when compared to their
former pay than those with more
seniority.  Petitioners filed suit under
the ADEA claiming disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact.  The city
defended on the ground that any
disparate impact was justified by a
legitimate business reason. The
reason proffered was that, in order to
remain competitive in the market-
place, the city needed to raise the pay
scale of younger employees.  This is the
first time that the Supreme Court has
analyzed whether disparate impact
claims may proceed under the ADEA.
The Court analyzed the legislative
history of the ADEA and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Congress
utilized the same language in the
statues, proclaiming that it is
unlawful for an employer “to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in
any way which would deprive any
individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his
statues an employee, because of such
individual’s age . . .”  The language of






(compiled by Yoo-Seong Song, Librar-
ian, Institute of Labor and Industrial
Relations Library, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
(Books and articles anotated in Further
References are available on interlibary loan
through ILLINET by contacting your local
public library or system headquarters.)
save for the word “age.” The Court
determined that the congressional
intent was clear, and that it was more
than reasonable to presume that
Congress intended the text to have the
same meaning in both statutes.
Following a lengthy discussion of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) and subsequent case law,
where the Court reiterated the
legitimacy and reasoning of disparate
impact claims, the Court delved into
the legal ramifications of disparate
impact claims under the ADEA.
The ADEA, unlike Title VII, was not
affected by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
For that reason, the Court carefully
explained that the scope of disparate
impact liability under the ADEA is
narrower than that of Title VII.  The
1991 amendments expanded the
coverage of Title VII but had no impact
on any interpretations of ADEA, or of
disparate impact liability.  The Court
made it clear that the analysis set
forth in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) applies to
disparate impact claims arising under
the ADEA. The Wards Cove decision
required an employee to identify the
specific employment practice that he
or she challenged, and to demonstrate
how that practice creates a disparate
impact.  After the plaintiff satisfies
this burden, the employer receives an
opportunity to rebut the prima facie
case by demonstrating that the
challenged practice serves significant
and legitimate employment interests.
Under Wards Cove, the ultimate
burden of proof is on the plaintiff.  This
schema, which was essentially over-
ruled by the 1991 amendments to Title
VII, now applies to ADEA disparate
impact analysis.
While ruling with the petitioners on
the applicability of disparate impact
analysis to the ADEA, the Court
nonetheless dismissed the petitioners’
case because their employer had an
“unquestionably reasonable” explana-
tion for the policy.  Justice Stevens
wrote the majority and was joined by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Scalia, and
Souter.  Justices Kennedy, O’Connor,
and Thomas, agreed in disposing of the
petitioners claim but would not have




Lemons, Bryan R.  PUBLIC PRI-
VACY: WARRANTLESS WORK-
PLACE SEARCHES OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES.  UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW, vol. 7, no. 1, Fall 2004.  pp.
1-37.
A public employer may want to search
an employee’s workplace for many
different reasons. The author dis-
cusses key issues to be considered
when a public employer decides to
search an employee’s workplace which
would include desks, offices, cabinets,
computers, and other equipment.  To
comply with the Fourth Amendment,
two questions must be resolved: 1) does
a reasonable expectation of privacy
exit? and 2) if a reasonable expectation
of privacy exists, was the search
reasonable? The author presents
factors to help make a determination
for each question.
Gazley, Beth. & Brudney, Jeffrey L.
VOLUNTEER INVOLVEMENT
IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: THE
CONTINUING QUESTION OF
CAPACITY.  PUBLIC ADMINIS-
TRATION REVIEW, vol. 65, no.
being emphasized whereas the
demand-side (local governments and
employees) is often neglected.  While
the number of volunteers for local
governments have increased after
September 11, there still are a few
issues to be resolved. Interestingly, a
significant percentage of public em-
ployees oppose volunteer involvement
for several reasons      most notably,
volunteers may pose a challenge to
their jobs and authority.
Lemke, Robert J.  ESTIMATING
THE UNION WAGE EFFECT
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACH-
ERS WHEN ALL TEACHERS
ARE UNIONIZED.  EASTERN
ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 30,
no. 2.  Spring 2004.  pp. 273-291.
While union membership in the
private sector has been decreasing,
over 90 percent of public school
teachers were reported to be unionized
in 1990.  The author investigates the
effectiveness of teachers’ unions in
terms of negotiating salaries by
focusing on the state of Pennsylvania.
The author concludes that the union
wage effect achieved by teachers’
unions in Pennsylvania is comparable
to that achieved by private sector
unions as well as other public sector
unions.  Also, it is similar to the union
wage effect for teachers’ unions in
1970 when union membership for
public school teachers was less than 30
percent.
2, March/April 2005.  pp.131-142.
This article examines the impact of
volunteerism on local governments
after September 11. The authors argue
that when promoting volunteerism on
federal and local levels, only the
supply-side (potential volunteers) is
—
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